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MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE LAW: IGNORING THE LESSONS FROM 
KING REX  
 
   
Katy Ferris* 
James Marson** 
 
ABSTRACT 
  
Following a review in 2013, the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB) established the 
Uninsured Drivers Agreement (UDA) 2015. The aim was to implement 
aspects of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives (MVID). The UDA 2015 
contained numerous errors in its drafting and led to widespread criticism due 
to its incompatibility with EU law and common law principles. In January 2017 
the MIB provided its Supplementary Uninsured Drivers Agreement. If its aim 
was to remedy these problems we argue that it has substantially failed. 
Further, the updated Agreement continues the uncertainty of the law in this 
area and, with reference to Fuller’s ‘Eight Ways to Fail to Make Law’, we 
present an argument that the Secretary of State for Transport should again 
redraft the UDA 2015 and the 2017 Supplement to provide legal certainty, 
remove the inconsistencies between national and EU law, and provide the 
protection to which third-party victims of uninsured drivers are entitled under 
EU law. 
 
MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 
 
Motor vehicle insurance in the UK is governed through statutory and extra-
statutory provisions. The statute (the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA88)) imposes 
duties to insure vehicles on a road or other public place, including 
requirements on insurance protection in the event that an individual is a victim 
of a negligent uninsured or untraced driver. The RTA88 provides protection 
for the third-party victims of uninsured drivers through (for example) enabling 
their claims directly against the policyholder’s insurers, but, in the event of the 
driver being uninsured, extra-statutory provisions 1  take over. Through the 
extra-statutory arrangements a third-party victim may recover compensation 
in the event that either the insurer is not contractually nor statutorily liable to 
compensate the victim, or that the individual causing the accident cannot be 
traced.  
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1
 The Cassel Committee (Cmnd 5528) in 1937, having reviewed the motor insurance 
legislation, recommended that a deficiency in the Acts be remedied through the creation of a 
central fund through which the third-party victims of uninsured drivers would be able to 
recover damages. Thereafter the government established an Agreement, in 1945, with the 
insurance industry, through a Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB), to undertake this central 
guarantee fund role. Presently, the MIB assumes the position of insurer for third-party victims 
of accidents caused by uninsured and untraced drivers.  
 2 
The national law governing motor vehicle insurance is also subject to EU law 
in the form of a series of six directives,2 collectively referred to as the motor 
vehicle insurance directives (MVID). The sixth MVID is a consolidating 
directive and therefore unless otherwise specified, this directive contains the 
provisions governing the law since its enactment in 2009. Through the MVID 
member states are obligated to establish a fund from which victims of 
uninsured 3  and untraced 4  motor vehicles and/or their drivers can obtain 
compensation. These responsibilities were to be designated to a central body 
and in the UK, the Government (through the Secretary of State for Transport) 
and the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (a private company which has entered into a 
series of agreements with the UK – (MIB)) satisfy this requirement. In this 
regard, the MIB acts as an insurer of last resort 5  through the Uninsured 
Drivers’ Agreement (UDA), most recently of 2015 with a supplementary UDA 
in 2017, and an Untraced Drivers’ Agreement (UtDA), most recently updated 
and given effect from March 2017. 
 
Due to the relationship between the MVID and the UK’s transposing 
legislation and the MIB Agreements, these national laws are subject to the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Further, 
they must be interpreted, as far as is possible,6 in accordance with the MVID. 
Given these parameters for transposition, interpretation and application of the 
law, the certainty necessary for citizens to understand the rights and 
obligations created through both sources is provided. In relation to the CJEU, 
legal certainty may be argued from a black-letter law perspective, aligned with 
predictability.7 Predictability is joined with rationally acceptable adjudications 
(in terms of solutions or outcomes) in ensuring the content of the law is 
                                                 
2
 (The First Directive) Council Directive 72/166/EEC on the approximation of the laws of 
Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability [1972] OJ 
L103/1; (the) Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles [1984] OJ LL8/17; (the) Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC on the approximation of 
the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use 
of motor vehicles [1990] OJ L129/33; Directive 2000/26/EC on the approximation of the laws 
of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (the Fourth Motor 
Insurance Directive) [2000] OJ L181/65; (the Fifth Directive) Directive 2005/14/EC amending 
Council Directives 72/166/EEC, 84/5/EEC, 88/357/EEC and 90/232/EEC and Directive 
2000/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to insurance against civil 
liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles [2005] OJ L149/14; and (the Sixth Directive) 
Directive 2009/103/EC relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability [2009] OJ 
L263/11. 
3
 A driver who caused or contributed to the accident and who, at the time held no valid policy 
of insurance, but who is identified. 
4
 A driver deemed responsible for the accident and who leaves the scene without identifying 
him/herself and cannot be traced. 
5
 Every insurer operating a business incorporating the underwriting of compulsory motor 
insurance is required to be a member of the MIB (RTA88, ss 95, 143 and 145(2)). 
6
 As per Case C-397/01 to C-403/01 Bernhard Pfeiffer et al v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, 
Kreisverband Walshut eV [2004] ECR I-8835; Cases C-10-22/97 Ministero delle Finanze v 
IN.CO.’90 Srl [1998] ECR I-6307 at [21]; and Case C-314/08 Krzysztof Filipiak, 19 November 
2009 at [18]. 
7
 Although this approach may lead to a less than complete answer to certainty. 
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determined and expressed as either a directly applicable measure or that it is 
used consistently in the CJEU’s interpretation and decisions. As such, both 
legal certainty and the principle of justice must be present in legal issuance 
and its application.  
 
LEGAL CERTAINTY: THE MIB, ITS AGREEMENTS AND 
INTERPRETATION 
 
The CJEU, 8  adopting a Cartesian philosophy, 9  has confirmed that legal 
certainty10 is a fundamental principle of EU law and imposes upon member 
states a requirement for transparency, precision, stability and predictability in 
law-making. 11  It assists in avoiding injustice 12  and imposes order on 
permissible actions, including rule-making and law-applying activities.13 In the 
dealings between the Secretary of State and the MIB in the creation of the 
UDA and UtDA, these principles almost seem to have been ignored. Further, 
the Government’s recent White Paper14 on the Great Repeal Bill and the legal 
transition in exiting the EU, has raised further issues of certainty – particularly 
present in the decision-making of the Court of Appeal and its adherence (or 
not) with the jurisprudence of the CJEU. 
 
The focus of this article is the critique of the main problems which exist in the 
Supplementary UDA 2017 (continuing and leaving unaltered several problems 
still present in the UDA 2015), and specifically a continuation of the MIB’s self-
exclusion of liability and in the administrative arrangements incorporated into 
the Agreement (imposed on those who use it). In the allegory of King Rex, 
Fuller15 outlines the eight principles of internal morality which are inherent 
qualities of a legal system. Problems exist in Rex’s well-intentioned (but 
                                                 
8
 From Case C-236/95 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:341 ‘the 
Court has consistently held that it is particularly important, in order to satisfy the requirement 
for legal certainty, that individuals should have the benefit of a clear and precise legal 
situation enabling them to ascertain the full extent of their rights and, where appropriate, to 
rely on them before the national courts.’ at [13].  
9
 Although recently van Meerbeeck has argued that this form of legal certainty could be 
replaced with a fiduciary logic based on trust. See J van Meerbeeck ‘The Principle of Legal 
Certainty in the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice: From Certainty to Trust’ (2016) 
41(2) European Law Review 275. 
10
 A term first used by the CJEU in Cases 42, 49/59 Société nouvelle des usines de Pontlieue 
- Aciéries du Temple (S.N.U.P.A.T.) v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel 
Community [1961] ECR 53. 
11
 See Case 70/83 Kloppenburg v Finanzamt Leer [1984] ECR 1075 at 1086; Case 169/80 
Administration des Douanes v Société Anonyme Gondrand Freres and Societe anonyme 
Garancini [1981] ECR 1931; Case C-182/03 and C-217/03, Belgium and Forum 187 v 
Commission [2006] ECR I-5479 at 69; and Case C-67/09 P Nuova Agricast and Cofra v 
Commission [2010] ECR I-09811 at [77]. 
12
 See J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999) for discussion of how injustice is avoided through a clarity of content, 
effectiveness and enforcement. 
13
 Bertelsmann Stiftung ‘2014 Rule of Law Report Legal Certainty, Judicial Review, 
Appointment of Justices, Corruption Prevention’ Sustainable Governance Indicators. 
14
 Department for Exiting the European Union (2017) ‘Legislating for the United Kingdom’s 
withdrawal from the European Union’ Cm 9446 (available at 
www.gov.uk/government/publications). 
15
 L L Fuller ‘Eight Ways to Fail to Make Law’ (2000) reprinted in J Feinberg & J Coleman 
eds, Philosophy of Law, sixth edition 91. 
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doomed) attempts to establish a fair system of legal rules based on codes and 
precedent (as legislator and judge). Establishing and maintaining ‘a system of 
legal rules may miscarry [fail] in at least eight ways; there are… eight distinct 
routes to disaster.’16 The eight ways are 1) A failure to achieve rules (every 
decision is made on an ad hoc basis with no generality); 2) a failure to make 
available the rules which parties are expected to observe; 3) the abuse of 
retroactive legislation; 4) a failure to make clear rules; 5) the enactment of 
contradictory rules; 6) rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the 
affected party (they are impossible to perform); 7) introducing such frequent 
changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action to them; and 8) a 
failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual 
administration. Fuller concludes on this point that ‘total failure in any one of 
these eight directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results 
in something that is not properly called a legal system at all…’17 For Fuller, 
the ‘eights ways to fail to make law’ were self-evident, applying as they did to 
a legal system – they are obvious in respect of the context of the frame of 
reference to which they are applied.18 Whilst the MVID and the UDA 2015 do 
not constitute a legal system as applied in the King Rex allegory, they form a 
significant aspect of motor insurance law relating to the protection of innocent 
victims of negligent uninsured drivers. Further in the article, we identify the 
examples in which the MIB and Secretary of State have ‘failed to make law’ in 
at least three aspects of Fuller’s ‘eight ways.’ 
 
Giving effect to the legal and procedural rights provided through the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU and the contents of the MVID, via the transposing 
national UDA, and their interpretation by the courts and dispute-resolving 
arbitrators, has proved to be contentious and fraught with errors.19 This has 
led to a system of uncertainty, far exceeding lexical ambiguity, guarantees 
from EU law not being met, and, we argue, a situation where a cancelling and 
re-writing of the most recent Supplementary UDA 2017 and the UDA 2015 is 
necessary to meet the legitimate expectations 20  of all involved in motor 
vehicle insurance. It is also in the application of the procedural requirements 
embedded in the UDA where questions may be raised of its adherence to 
principles of justice.21 
 
For Dicey, certainty of law (as part of the rule of law) is guaranteed not only by 
the law-makers, but also the courts in the definition, application and 
enforcement of the law. At the EU level, certainty is based on the German 
                                                 
16
 L L Fuller ‘Eight Ways to Fail to Make Law’ (2000) reprinted in J Feinberg & J Coleman 
eds, Philosophy of Law, sixth edition 91, 93. 
17
 L L Fuller ‘Eight Ways to Fail to Make Law’ (2000) reprinted in J Feinberg & J Coleman 
eds, Philosophy of Law, sixth edition 91, 93. 
18
 For further discussion of this point see P Popelier ‘Legal Certainty and the Principles of 
Proper Law Making’ (2000) European Journal of Law Reform 321. 
19
 See J Marson, K Ferris, and A Nicholson ‘Irreconcilable differences? The Road Traffic Act 
and the European Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives’ (2017) The Journal of Business Law 1, 
51. 
20
 K D Logue ‘Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law is Uncertain’ (2007) 27 
Virginia Tax Review 241, 248. 
21
 This is particularly so with regards the finality of civil proceedings with the compulsory use 
of a paper-based system of arbitration when appealing a decision of the MIB. 
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doctrine and jurisprudence ‘Dispositionssicherheit’ - the ‘personal freedom to 
decide and develop oneself, made possible… by the predictability of the 
whole legal framework.’22 However, conflicts exist between, on the one hand, 
certainty, and on the other justice. Insurers, policyholders and the innocent 
third-party victims of negligent drivers require that the law is certain, but also 
that justice is available through the EU and transposing national instruments. 
Legal certainty aligns with tenets such as uniformity, predictability and non-
arbitrariness, while justice may involve exceptions to these principles as it 
necessitates adaptability. Both are features of a just legal system, and hence 
require a balanced, nuanced approach to their adoption and promotion. The 
interpretation necessary of the UDA 2015 and Supplementary UDA 2017 in 
the spirit of the MVID on which it is based, and to whose provisions it must 
adhere, is an issue which is likely to affect the certainty of law.  
 
Legal certainty, in isolation, of course consists of inherent weakness. The 
openness of law, its open sphere, empowers the judiciary with authority to 
create new laws in similar fashion to a legislator (adopting what Kelsen refers 
to as a ‘free discretion’). 23  Even where correctness exists within the 
framework of the legal system, this does not necessarily result in predictability 
for citizens. For example, the House of Lords was in White v White24 faced 
with interpreting cl 6 of the UDA 1999 (the exclusions to liability permissible to 
the MIB). Whilst the Lords interpreted these consistently and correctly25 with 
reference to the MVID and the judgments of the CJEU, these sources did not 
constitute a dictionary definition nor a literal interpretation of the content of the 
legislative or judicial issuance. As such, the uncertainty present in that 
Agreement would have led to an average person to have been mistaken as to 
the extent and meaning of cl 6 without access to legal advice or a strong 
sense of their own ability to purposively interpret national law / rules with the 
EU parent. The lessons from the UDA 1999 regarding the need for clarity, and 
that here the rule as announced and its actual administration was 
incongruent, could lead to Fuller’s eighth way to fail to make law. 
 
The Secretary of State and the MIB have updated the Agreement on the issue 
of uninsured drivers in 1999, 2015 and most recently in 2017. The 1999 
Agreement has effect between the 13 August 1999 to 2 July 2015 and the 
2015 Agreement applies from 3 July 2015 (albeit subject to deletions of cll 7 
and 9 as from the 1 March 2017). The legacy of these Agreements has the 
consequence that individuals affected during these dates are subject to the 
Agreement in place at the time. They do not repeal the previous Agreement 
and therefore, for example, anyone so affected by a clause in the UDA 2015 
occurring before 1 March 2017 would still be affected by the breaches in that 
Agreement, despite the removal of two of the EU-offending clauses through 
the Supplementary UDA 2017. As such, legacy breaches may still continue to 
                                                 
22
 P Popelier ‘Legal Certainty and the Principles of Proper Law Making’ (2000) European 
Journal of Law Reform 321, 327. 
23
 H Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law. Translation from the Second German Edition by Max Knight 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 349. 
24
 [2001] UKHL 9. 
25
 Other aspects of the judgment were incorrect as to the requirements of the MVID. 
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adversely affect a third-party victim, despite any update in a subsequent 
Agreement. 
 
THE EU AND CERTAINTY 
 
The MIB acts as the insurer of last resort for the innocent victims of identified 
uninsured drivers. Here the victim claims compensation for his/her injuries 
from the MIB as if the uninsured driver was insured,26 via the UDA 2015 (as 
amended by the Supplementary UDA 2017). The certainty of the Agreements 
relate to what it means and is understood by the average person (or indeed 
lawyer and judge) and hence how this affects the person’s behaviour and 
ability to orientate their behaviour.  
 
According to Dworkin, certainty is increased in advanced legal systems that 
are ‘thick with constitutional rules and practices, and dense with precedents 
and statutes…’27 It cannot be justifiably argued that motor vehicle insurance is 
not replete with rules, practices, precedents and statutes to guide citizens, 
organisations and the legislators in adhering to the underlying requirements to 
facilitate the free movement principles upon which they are founded. 
However, this has not increased certainty nor prevented the subjectivity in the 
transposition of EU rules by the UK. It was in SIAT28 where the CJEU, when 
addressing the compatibility between a Treaty Article and national law, 
commented with reference to the lack of objectivity in the application of the 
national rules. It remarked that, in failing to satisfy the requirements of legal 
certainty, the lack of precision ‘… does not make it possible, at the outset, to 
determine its scope with sufficient precision and its applicability remains a 
matter of uncertainty.’29 The national provision in question was not ‘… clear, 
precise and predictable as regards their effects, in particular where they may 
have unfavourable consequences for individuals and undertakings’30 (authors’ 
emphasis). Further, the CJEU held that with regards to the free movement 
principles, ‘… a rule which does not meet the requirements of the principle of 
legal certainty cannot be considered to be proportionate to the objectives 
pursued.’31 
 
The inconsistency between national and EU law spans both judicial 
interpretations and the statutory and extra-statutory provisions. Hence, 
specifically in relation to the UDA 2015 and the Supplementary UDA 2017, the 
MIB and Secretary of State had the opportunity to redress the previous 
incompatibilities and uncertainty of the law,32 and at the very least, to remove 
                                                 
26
 The MIB will attempt to recover any disbursement from the uninsured driver. 
27
 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977), 286.  
28
 Case C-318/10 Societe d'investissement pour l'agriculture tropicale SA (SIAT) v Etat belge 
EU:C:2012:415. 
29
 Case C-318/10 Societe d'investissement pour l'agriculture tropicale SA (SIAT) v Etat belge 
EU:C:2012:415 at [57]. 
30
 Case C-318/10 Societe d'investissement pour l'agriculture tropicale SA (SIAT) v Etat belge 
EU:C:2012:415 at [58]. 
31
 Case C-318/10 Societe d'investissement pour l'agriculture tropicale SA (SIAT) v Etat belge 
EU:C:2012:415 at [59]. 
32
 See N Bevan ‘Part II: Why the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 Needs to be Scrapped’ 
(2011) 2 Journal of Personal Injury Law, 123. 
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the misleading and conflicting content of the Agreement remaining following 
the supplementary update. There are many aspects of the Agreements which 
are seemingly contrary to EU law requirements. The focus of this article, 
however, is the content of the UDA 2015 which outlines permissible 
exclusions of liability of the MIB in relation to uninsured drivers and aspects of 
the application of certain procedural rules, and the failure to remedy these in 
the Supplementary UDA 2017. 
 
UDA EXCLUSIONS 
 
To reiterate, the MVID is designed with the intention of protecting the third-
party victims of uninsured drivers or of untraced vehicles through providing 
compensation at the level they could expect to receive in a claim against an 
identified and insured driver. To ensure harmonization of the law, member 
states are required to give effect to the directives and are restricted from 
actions which would undermine the objectives of the directives or to make 
access to their provisions more difficult than under comparable national law. 
 
There are many examples where the courts have failed to give effect to the 
MVID through the national laws and have thus failed to provide certainty to 
this aspect of motor vehicle insurance.33 Here, the judiciary’s interpretation of 
the UDA 2015 inherently lacks the second-order correctness34  of content 
required under the MVID and transgresses the norms of free movement, 
underpinning the Treaties. The UDA 2015 and UDA 2017 both distort the 
meaning of the MVID in significant ways and this is exacerbated when the 
MIB and Secretary of State prepare an updated/supplementary Agreement 
which seemingly addresses problems contained in the previous document. If 
we concentrate on the exclusions of liability to which the MIB is responsible, 
as contained in the UDA 2015, it is quite evident how confusion is present and 
individuals may not have certainty in determining the national provisions when 
compared with the EU parent directives. The areas where the MIB exempts 
itself from responsibility to act as insurer of last resort are identified in cll 4-10 
UDA 2015. The most egregious transgressions are identified below and are 
compared with the MVID and the requirements established at EU law. 
 
The UDA 2015 cl 5 exempts the MIB from being liable for a claim arising out 
of the use of a vehicle which is not, itself, required to be covered by a contract 
of insurance (unless its use is (actually) covered by such an insurance policy). 
Whilst it is widely understood that cars lawfully used on a road or other public 
place must be subject to minimum insurance cover, certain vehicles, in 
accordance with the RTA88 s 144, are exempt. For example, vehicles owned 
                                                 
33
 See cases including Delaney v Pickett [2012] PIQR P10, [2011] EWCA Civ 1532 and EUI v 
Bristol Alliance Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267. 
34
 In Alexy’s thesis, correctness of content is concerned with practical questions, such as 
what is instructed, prevented and permitted apart from norms issued in the positive law. Here 
Alexy establishes two levels/stages of correctness of content – first-order and second-order. 
First-order correctness refers to an ideal dimension of justice. Second-order correctness 
adopts a more all-encompassing role incorporating legal certainty and justice. The second-
order correctness introduces a balancing between legal certainty as a formal principle and 
justice as a material/substantive principle. (R Alexy ‘On the Concept and the Nature of Law’ 
(2008) 21 Ratio Juris 281. 
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or in the possession of organizations such as the National Health Service, the 
police force and local authorities would not require insurance cover as any 
claim should be met through them directly rather than through the MIB. This is 
problematic insofar as compatibility with the Sixth MVID is concerned. Article 
3 of the MVID provides for the compulsory insurance of vehicles in member 
states and at Article 5, there exists a derogation from the obligation in respect 
of compulsory insurance of vehicles. However, member states are still tasked 
with taking all appropriate measures to ensure civil liability in respect of the 
use of vehicles is covered by insurance. Clause 5 of the UDA 2015 is in 
breach of the MVID by enabling the insurer of last resort/guarantee fund body 
to avoid its liability to third-party victims in the event of injury caused by an 
uninsured driver. 
 
UDA 2015, at cl 6, permits the MIB to avoid liability or to deduct payments to a 
third-party victim of an uninsured driver. Such payments include those the 
victim would be entitled to receive through accident insurance payments or via 
compensation, and are subject to given exclusions. The exclusions 35  are 
contrary to rights held at common law and the distinction between the rights 
available through a claim via the MIB Agreements and those at common law 
have been held unlawful.36 Whilst the sixth MVID does enable member states 
to make deductions from the compensation payment made to a third-party 
victim, this is included to prevent the situation of the double payment of 
compensation (for example where the claimant has been in receipt of a 
payment through a state-run benefits system or who may have recovered 
funds through a compensation scheme and who then seeks an award through 
the MIB Agreement). The only permissible exclusion against the payment of 
compensation allowed through the sixth MVID is ‘in respect of persons who 
voluntarily entered the vehicle which caused the damage or injury when the 
body can prove that they knew it was uninsured.’ 37  Clause 6 UDA 2015 
exceeds this limitation and breaches the MVID.  
 
Clause 7 allows the MIB to avoid liability for damage to vehicles on the basis 
that, at the material time when the damage was caused, there was no 
contract of insurance for the use of the vehicle and, the claimant knew this or 
ought to have reason to believe no valid insurance was in place. The issue of 
the claimant’s (perceived) knowledge is referred to as ‘constructive 
knowledge’ and is also a feature of cl 8. Clause 8 applies to situations where 
a victim, as a passenger in a vehicle in which the driver was responsible for 
the accident, attempts to claim against the driver or anyone else who may be 
responsible for the driver’s use of the vehicle. The MIB avoids liability for the 
claim where the claimant voluntarily allowed themselves to be a passenger in 
the vehicle and either before the start of the journey, or after it starts,38 the 
passenger (as victim) knew or had reason to believe that it had been stolen, 
unlawfully taken, or was being used without a contract of insurance being in 
                                                 
35
 From the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority and an employer’s non-insured 
refundable advance. 
36
 White v White [2001] UKHL 9 at [34]. 
37
 Art. 10(2). 
38
 For instance, if the victim could reasonably be expected to have alighted from it. 
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place. This phraseology was used in previous incarnations of the UDA39 and 
even despite minor changes between the wording used in the 199940 and 
201541 UDAs, along with the removal of the EU-offending ‘crime exemption’42 
of the MIB to victims who had knowingly allowed themselves to be carried in 
vehicles which were used in the furtherance of a crime, the clauses breach 
Art. 10(2) of the sixth MVID.43 The MVID requires ‘proof’ of knowledge by the 
victim. Even the House of Lords extending actual knowledge to purposefully 
not enquiring44 about the existence of insurance breached the MVID as no 
similar provision is contained in the directive. 
 
Clause 9 of the UDA 2015, despite its brevity, has potentially profound 
implications for third-party victims of uninsured drivers. The clause reads: 
‘[The] MIB is not liable for any claim, or any part of a claim, where the death, 
bodily injury or damage to property was caused by, or in the course of, an act 
of terrorism within the meaning of s 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000.’45 The result 
was an exemption for the MIB to have to settle claims in those specific 
circumstances.46 Problems were caused with the definition of ‘terrorism’ being 
based on that included in the Terrorism Act (TA) 2000.47 It was unusual and 
indeed unnecessary for the inclusion of this clause given that the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence exempted the MIB from being required to satisfy a claim against 
an uninsured vehicle which use did not constitute a normal use of a vehicle.48 
In another article49 we outlined the hypothetical situations which use of TA 
2000 s 1 could lead to (for example a third party victim of a road traffic 
accident caused by an uninsured driver of a car fleeing the scene of his 
arsonist attack having killed victims employed at an anti-GM crop facility). 
Another third-party victim of an accident caused by an uninsured driver not 
involved in a terrorist act would, by contrast, be protected and have the claim 
dealt with by the MIB. 
 
                                                 
39
 Clause 6 UDA 1999. 
40
 ‘… ought to have known.’  
41
 ‘… had reason to believe.’ 
42
 Delaney v Secretary of State [2015] EWCA Civ 172. 
43
 Similar breaches when using ‘constructive knowledge’ apply to RTA88 151(4). 
44
 White v White [2001] UKHL 9 at [34]. 
45
 Although the use of this definition is not limited to the UDA 2015 – see for instance the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 s 74; the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 s 15; and 
the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 s 54. 
46
 The ‘terrorism exclusion’ clause operates to void the MIB of liability in those specific 
circumstances and is a clause which began life in UtDA 2003 cl 5.1(g). 
47
 For an of the Terrorism Act 2000 see C Gearty ‘Terrorism and Human Rights: A Case 
Study in Impending Legal Realities’ (1999) 19 Legal Studies, 367. 
48
 The TA 2000 definition of terrorism is itself questionable as to its appropriateness for the 
various purposes to which it is applied – see C Walker, Terrorism and the Law (OUP, 2011). 
Further, in Case C-162/13 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2146, a case decided prior to the creation of the UDA 2015, the CJEU held 
that vehicles must be used for their intended purpose. Where this is not adhered to, use 
would be construed as ‘misuse’ and the MVID would not have effect. Therefore, no 
compulsory third-party insurance would be required and the MIB would have no role in any 
subsequent claim for damages. 
49
 J Marson, and K Ferris ‘The Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 2015 as a Legitimate Source of 
Authority’ (2016) Statute Law Review, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmw043 where we 
outline the deficiencies in the Agreement with regards its compatibility with EU law. 
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Law should be accurate. In relation to the MVID, the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU clarifies many areas of contention with regards the RTA88 and the 
UDA. This is not to say that, of itself, the EU’s teleological approach to 
statutory interpretation creates certainty. The EU’s addition to the domestic 
interpretation of national law within the spirit of the EU parent can lead to ‘… a 
regime in which reliance and predictability are wholly subsumed to constant 
change and, correspondingly, an unstable legal framework.’ 50  However, 
uncertainty here does not refer to a lack of legislative provision in its 
implementation or judicial direction in its application. The uncertainty lies in 
the differing rules between the EU source and the UK national implementing 
measure, and in the definitive status provided to the MIB and its Agreement 
with the Secretary of State. For example, the interpretation provided by the 
judiciary in the UK holds the MIB not to have emanation of the State status. In 
light of authority from the CJEU, this position is questionable and not in 
conformity with EU jurisprudence.51   
 
THE SUPPLEMENTARY UNINSURED DRIVERS AGREEMENT 2017 
 
Following the establishing of the recent UDAs and UtDAs, public calls for a 
comprehensive review and subsequent changes to their content and scope 
were made.52 The MIB disagreed, considering that the provisions of the UDA 
were compatible with its legal requirements. Yet in 2017, it provided as a 
rationale for the Supplementary UDA ‘We understand that the government felt 
its hands were tied and they must comply with the [sixth MVID]; so both the 
[UDA and UtDA] have to change.’53 
 
The extent of the exclusions contained in the UDA 2015 were significant and 
articulated in clear terms breaches of the MVID. Beyond the judicial review54 
currently progressing in court brought by the charity RoadPeace which seeks 
rectification of the breaches in the UDA 2015 and the 2003 UtDA (this latter 
Agreement was more substantially updated in March 2017), the MIB and the 
Secretary of State sought to use this opportunity to update the UDA 2015. In 
                                                 
50
 A L Tyler, ‘Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons’ (2005) 99 Northwestern University Law 
Review 1389, 1418.  
51
 See a case involving the status of the MIB of Ireland; Case C‐356/05 Farrell [2007] ECR I‐
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52
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so doing it has changed some of the wording to achieve parity with those 
used in the UtDA 2017, albeit this was a relatively minor series of changes.  
 
The Supplementary Agreement provides: 
 
‘2. This Agreement shall come into force on the 01 day of March 2017 
and applies to accidents occurring on or after that date. From that time 
onwards, the 2015 Agreement shall continue to apply in all respects 
save as provided for by the amendments set out below.  
3. The whole of clauses 7 (vehicle damage) and 9 (terrorism) are 
omitted but, notwithstanding this, the numbering of the subsequent 
clauses remains unchanged.’  
 
Hence, cll 7 and 9 were both repealed from the UDA 2015 in the 
Supplementary UDA 2017. Both the UDA 1999 and 2015 excluded the MIB55 
from having to settle claims against an uninsured driver where the claimant’s 
vehicle was also uninsured. Deleting this clause in the UDA 2017 prevents 
insurers dealing with claims on behalf of the MIB against an uninsured driver 
from refusing to meet a claim where the claimant’s vehicle was uninsured. 
Secondly, the terrorism exclusion which was misconceived from the outset 
has also been removed without recourse to further legal action (although it 
remains an aspect of the judicial review proceedings brought by RoadPeace).  
 
However, each of the existing clauses which operated in the UDA 2015 and 
have not been expressly deleted (cll 5,6 and 8) continue to breach the MVID 
and have not been addressed. Despite the Court of Appeal’s position in the 
recent case of Sahin v Havard 56  that the RTA88 and MIB Agreements 
collectively achieve the requirements of the MVID,57 these inconsistencies do 
nothing to improve legal certainty or give drivers, insurers and third-party 
victims adequate instruction as to their legal rights and obligations. Indeed, 
the application of the law in the courts does nothing to assist with remedying 
the current uncertainty.58 
 
Actions contrary to the legal certainty principle include provisions which are 
meaningless or irreconcilable with the content of other (EU) laws (including cll 
5,6 and 8 UDA 2015 and s 148(2) RTA88);59 where provisions are repealed or 
                                                 
55
 And also any Art. 79 insurer acting as the agent of the MIB. Article 79 refers to that part of 
the MIB’s Articles of Association which provides: ‘Article 79 - Domestic Regulations. The 
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Members.’ (available at https://www.mib.org.uk/media/311594/mib-member-application-form-
supporting-document-version-60.pdf). 
56
 Sahin v Havard and Riverstone Insurance (UK) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1202. 
57
 See paras [8], [13], [16–28], [32], [33], and [34] of the judgment. 
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 J Marson, and K Ferris ‘Misunderstanding and Misapplication of Motor Insurance Law. Will 
the Supreme Court come to the Rescue?’ (2017) European Journal of Current Legal Issues 
(forthcoming). 
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substantially altered (including cll 7 and 9 UDA after 1 March 2017 but whose 
application continues for incidents covered by the previous applicable UDA);60 
and where the issue is so complex that citizens would be unable to know the 
extent of the law (for example the current application of s 148(2) RTA88).61 
Each of these elements may be found in the exclusion clauses within the UDA 
2015. The Agreement frequently fails to provide authoritative issuance on 
significant matters clearly defined in the parent MVID and/or the deductive 
reasoning provided by the CJEU. Judgments made in accordance with the 
UDA 2015 would fail the test of rational argumentation, and, as will be 
observed below, the application of the Agreement in accordance with 
procedural rules would lack the required adaptability (particularly in relation to 
the current status of the MIB as not constituting an emanation of the state) to 
provide justice. The Supplementary UDA 2017 and the UDA 2015 fail the dual 
nature of law.62 
 
THE GREAT REPEAL BILL 
 
Despite the assertion by the Government that the UK’s exit from the European 
Union (commonly referred to as Brexit) will establish greater certainty for, 
amongst others, the legal system, the White Paper63 introduced on 30 March 
2017 included details regarding the mechanism of the transition from EU law 
to national law. The Government proposes to convert the ‘acquis’ of EU law 
into national law on the coming into force of the Great Repeal Bill (read Act) 
following the repeal of the European Communities Act. Such an approach will 
see national law as supreme, 64  that existing directly applicable EU laws 
(Treaty Articles and Regulations) will be subsumed into national law65 (via 
secondary legislation) and existing EU laws already transposed into national 
law will be preserved.66  Provisions from Treaties which may be relied on 
directly in national courts (and hence have direct effect) will continue to be 
available67 and, perhaps much more significantly in terms of motor vehicle 
insurance law, whilst the jurisdiction of the CJEU will be brought to an end, its 
historic jurisprudence will have the same binding precedence as decisions of 
the UK Supreme Court.68 
 
The Government, whilst acknowledging the potential problem of leaving the 
EU, its laws and the jurisprudence of the CJEU, sought to reassure readers of 
the White Paper. It provides examples of EU-based laws which will continue 
and interpretations of laws provided by the CJEU which will also continue to 
be used in the post-Brexit era in an attempt to provide certainty and clarity of 
                                                 
60
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61
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62
 For discussion of this theoretical position see R Alexy ‘The Dual Nature of Law’ (2010) 23 
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 Department for Exiting the European Union (2017) ‘Legislating for the United Kingdom’s 
withdrawal from the European Union’ Cm 9446 (available at 
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 Para. 2.3. 
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 Para. 2.4. 
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 Para. 2.11. 
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 Paras 2.12-2.17. 
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the law. 69  At paragraphs 2.16 and 2.17 the White Paper continues its 
assessment of the implications of previous CJEU decisions. It identifies that 
adherence to, and the continuation of, the jurisprudence established by the 
CJEU is important as it maximizes legal certainty, but it does not want this 
intention to ‘fossilise the past decisions of the CJEU forever.’70 The Supreme 
Court will have the ability, derived from a practice statement made by the 
House of Lords in 1966 and adopted by the Supreme Court in 2010, to treat 
previous decisions as binding but with the ability to depart from these when it 
appears right to do so. At paragraph 2.17 the White Paper continues that the 
Government expects the Supreme Court to take a  
 
‘similar, sparing approach to departing from CJEU case law. We are 
also examining whether it might be desirable for any additional steps to 
be taken to give further clarity about the circumstances in which such a 
departure might occur. Parliament will be free to change the law, and 
therefore overturn case law, where it decides it is right to do so.’ 
 
This poses an interesting conundrum for the application of motor vehicle 
insurance law in post-Brexit Britain.71 Whilst the UK government will have the 
right to change EU-based laws following a review and submission to 
Parliament, on Brexit day the jurisprudence of the CJEU will take effect akin to 
a precedent established by the Supreme Court. By way of just one example, 
the problem for the UK’s compliance with the MVID will come starkly into 
focus. Section 148 RTA88 governs where insurers may and may not seek to 
avoid a contract of insurance. Following the supply of a certificate of 
insurance, there are eight ‘matters’ which, if attempted to be used by an 
insurer to avoid their liabilities, would be held void. The matters are contained 
in s 148(2) and relate to:  
 
(a) the age or physical or mental condition of persons driving the vehicle;  
(b) the condition of the vehicle;  
(c) the number of persons that the vehicle carries;  
(d) the weight or physical characteristics of the goods that the vehicle carries; 
(e) the time at which or the areas within which the vehicle is used; 
(f) the horsepower or cylinder capacity or value of the vehicle; 
(g) the carrying on the vehicle of any particular apparatus; or 
                                                 
69
 The EU Council clearly does not agree with the UK’s positive perception of the impending 
legal certainty following the Brexit notification: ‘The United Kingdom's decision to leave the 
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Kingdom's Notification under Article 50 TEU’ Brussels, 31 March 2017 (OR. en), XT 
21001/17, 2.  
70
 Para. 2.16. 
71
 For our interpretation of the possibilities see J Marson, K Ferris, and A Nicholson ‘Brexit 
means Brexit: What does it mean for the Protection of Third Party Victims and the Road 
Traffic Act 1988?’ (2017) Statute Law Review, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmx006. 
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(h) the carrying on the vehicle of any particular means of identification other 
than any means of identification required to be carried by or under [the 
Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994]. 
 
The extent of the application of s 148(2) RTA88 was considered in EUI v 
Bristol Alliance Partnership.72 The case involved an individual who, using his 
motor vehicle, attempted to commit suicide by driving into a building. In the 
course of this activity the driver damaged the property of another motorist. 
Under the terms of the contractual policy, the motor insurer had sought to 
exclude liability for ‘deliberate acts’ and therefore sought to avoid the claim of 
the third-party motorist who had suffered damage by the deliberate actions of 
the insured driver. The question to be considered by the Court of Appeal was 
whether such an attempted exclusion was permitted under s 148(2). This 
issue of national laws which seek to permit the exclusion of contractual liability 
in motor vehicle policies had been previously determined by the CJEU in Ruiz 
Bernaldez.73 The CJEU had confirmed that the only permissible grounds for 
excluding a third party’s right to claim against the policyholder’s insurers was 
where the third party knew that the vehicle was stolen74 (this being the only 
permissible derogation from such insurance cover as outlined in the MVID). 
The Bernaldez75 reasoning was also confirmed in the later cases of Correia 
Ferreira v Companhia de Seguros Mundial Confiança SA, 76  Candolin v 
Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtio Pohjola, 77  Farrell v Whitty, 78  and Churchill v 
Wilkinson and Tracey Evans. 79  However, in EUI v Bristol Alliance 
Partnership80 the Court of Appeal refused to follow the principles established 
in Bernaldez and held they were not of general application. In a unanimous 
judgment delivered by Ward LJ, the Court of Appeal concluded that as s 
148(2) provided a finite list of matters, this should be interpreted as 
exhaustive rather than illustrative (as CJEU jurisprudence would require). 
 
Given the obligation that the jurisprudence of the CJEU will become the 
equivalent to precedent established by the Supreme Court, decisions such as 
that delivered in EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership will no longer be able to 
disregard EU-compliant authority. It will, in essence, be overruled by the 
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CJEU (now Supreme Court) authority in Bernaldez.81 The Court of Appeal, 
which has historically and more recently82 transgressed precedent established 
by the CJEU, will now be forced to comply with EU law. Evidently the 
Government may change the legislation, and it is not impossible to consider 
that the Government will have a new RTA prepared prior to Brexit or indeed 
one ready to be enacted in the immediate aftermath, but pending such an 
eventuality, the landscape of motor vehicle insurance law is likely to change 
and whether this will establish legal certainty is at this stage still questionable. 
 
THE APPLICATION PROCESS UNDER THE MIB AGREEMENTS  
 
Road users and pedestrians in the UK are entitled to clear guidance regarding 
not only their rights in relation to compulsory insurance provisions but also the 
circumstances and extent to which public authorities may interfere with their 
rights. All claims are subject to procedural rules, but it is arguable that those 
applied to the MIB Agreements breach comparable measures through the 
Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 1998.  
 
When making a claim to the MIB, an application form of eight pages must be 
completed. The depth of questions required to be answered of the claimant 
are quite different from those required under the RTA 1 claim notification form 
under the CPR. 83  This requires the claimant’s personal details – name, 
address, occupation, national insurance number, vehicle details and accident 
details (including injury and medical information, any rehabilitation required 
and vehicle damage). Even in RTA 1 Section H, claims under the MIB 
scheme for uninsured cases merely requires details of the defendant (a brief 
description, their approximate age and sex) and their vehicle. RTA 1 Section 
L, detailing the funding of the claim, is limited to details of any conditional fee 
arrangement entered into, the existence of an insurance policy, or an 
agreement with a membership organization which will meet the claimant’s 
costs.  
 
The MIB claim form is considerably more detailed but it is in Section 12 where 
stark differences are evident. Here the claimant consents to the MIB and their 
representatives using his personal and sensitive information (including 
medical information and criminal convictions relevant to the claim); 84  the 
release of all information to the MIB or its representatives from any source 
which the MIB believes may possess relevant information to the claim for 
compensation. This may include, but is not limited to, information requested 
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from: the claimant’s employers (such as wage and other benefit/pension 
details, absence/attendance records, the full personnel file, and precise 
contract details); any government department (such as all applications for 
benefits, tax records, payments made, driving licence details including 
relevant endorsements); and insurance companies (including full details of 
any policies held, claims made, monies received).85 Further, in Section 12 the 
claimant explicitly authorizes any health professional with whom they have 
consulted at any time to provide the MIB or its representatives with any 
relevant information (this is all the claimant’s health records and notes) 
concerning their past, present, or anticipated future, physical or mental 
health.86 Finally, in the event that the claimant has provided personal data 
about a third party (other than any uninsured driver) as part of the claim, they 
purport to have obtained the freely given agreement of the individual(s) 
concerned to enable the MIB to use their personal data, including any 
sensitive personal data, where practicable.87 
 
The extent of the information required to be provided, and to which access 
must be given, is significant. It is open to question whether such information is 
necessary to enable the MIB to fulfil its duties under the Supplementary UDA 
2017, UDA 2015 and the MVID. The personal data to be surrendered greatly 
exceeds that which is needed to pursue a claim under the auspices of the 
CPR and even may be questionable with regards the individual’s right to 
privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
respect for an individual’s private and family life requires no interference by a 
public authority except in accordance with the law. This includes, where it is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country; for the prevention of disorder 
or crime; for the protection of health or morals; or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. Clearly, Art. 8 is by its nature open-ended, but 
its interpretation covers both negative, as well as positive88 obligations on the 
state. Key issues in question regarding the invoking of Art. 8 is the ‘necessity’ 
of the requirements of the MIB disclosures in Section 12 of the claim form. 
This is satisfied where any interference of the individual’s privacy corresponds 
to a pressing social need, 89  and that the need is proportionate to the 
legitimate aim being pursued. Given the extent of the information provided, 
and when compared under equivalence to the CPR, it does not appear ex 
facie that such information is required to satisfy the pressing need of enabling 
a victim of an uninsured or untraced driver to claim from a central fund. When 
coupled with the compulsory requirement of arbitration with no right of appeal 
to higher courts, the presence of safeguards at national law which have 
generally prevented a breach of the proportionality principle of the measure 
being necessary in a democratic society, are uncertain.90 It could be argued to 
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the contrary that the limitations on public finances91  requires the full and 
complete disclosure of the claimant’s private information to prevent unworthy 
claims; however, the RTA88 s 154 was designed to facilitate, rather than to 
reduce, the effectiveness of an individual recovering compensation to which 
they were entitled. The MVID also requires the individual to be provided 
compensation from the state fund and it is quite possible to mount an 
argument that the administration of the claim form required by the MIB could 
dissuade a genuine claimant from pursuing their action for recovery. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Returning to King Rex and his attempts to revise his legal code: 
 
‘The resulting code was a model of clarity, but as it was studied it 
became apparent that its new clarity had merely brought to light that it 
was honeycombed with contradictions. It was reliably reported that 
there was not a single provision in the code that was not nullified by 
another provision inconsistent with it.’92 
 
The legitimacy of the UDA 2015 and the Supplementary UDA 2017 as being 
compliant with the MVID has been an area of contention since their inception. 
The MVID and the jurisprudence of the CJEU have developed the law relating 
to third-party victims of uninsured drivers and untraced vehicles. This has, 
however, often been stunted through the Agreements between the Secretary 
of State and the MIB and national courts (notably the Court of Appeal). Law is 
a regulatory concept but, whilst unable to offer definitive solutions to each 
potentially unanswerable question, it at least has the ability to provide a 
method of determinacy. However, the Court of Appeal has on several 
occasions, refused to follow the reasoning of the CJEU on the interpretation 
and application of the MVID through its myopic view of national laws. Brexit 
has furthered the uncertainty of the law in two key aspects. First, the 
Government has announced that it will use Parliamentary powers to review 
existing EU laws and selectively remove those from national application which 
do not adhere to the Government’s strategy. Secondly, historic CJEU 
decisions will be incorporated in UK law and be considered of the same 
standing as judgments of the Supreme Court. As such, case law from the 
Bernaldez93  line of reasoning will, following Brexit-day, be binding on the 
Court of Appeal and decisions such as in EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership94 
will be unavailable to that national court. Either the Government will pre-empt 
such an eventuality and change the RTA in advance of Brexit or it will lead to 
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many appeals to the Supreme Court to clarify national provisions from their 
historic EU lineage. 
 
The motor vehicle insurance laws in the UK are in a state of flux. This does 
not help any user or participant in this area. Of course, a level of uncertainty 
has to be found in all legal systems95 and in their application, but legal and 
administrative inconsistencies affecting the UDA 2015 (and subsequently) its 
Supplementary UDA 2017 have been identified and discussed, and yet the 
Government and the courts are often failing to apply the law in conformity with 
superior EU law.96 A reading of the UDA 2015 reveals a succinct and clear 
outline of the breadth of the MIB’s liability and responsibility to third-party 
victims of an uninsured driver. However, it is a contradictory document when 
considered in the light of its EU-law parent. Similarly, the RTA88 fails to 
correspond with the MVID in a number of areas.97 
 
The Secretary of State for Transport, the MIB and the UK executive (along 
with elements of the judiciary) have collectively failed to make the law of 
motor vehicle insurance clear and certain. Whether, as with King Rex, they 
were misguided but ultimately well intentioned when creating the national law 
is ambiguous. What is definite, however, is that, like King Rex, their actions 
were ultimately doomed. 
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